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Abstract
This study estimates the e¤ects of revenue-neutral tax structure changes on the long-run
level of income per capita using panel data for 17 OECD countries over the period 1970-2004.
In contrast to previous studies, we do not nd a robust ranking of di¤erent types of taxes in
terms of their "growth e¤ects". In particular, we do not obtain compelling evidence favouring
consumption taxes over income taxes, or favouring personal income taxes over corporate income
taxes. The only robust result appears to be that shifts in tax revenue towards property taxes
are associated with a higher level of income per capita in the long run.
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1 Introduction
There has been a large body of literature on the optimal structure of taxation from the perspectives
of e¢ ciency and income distribution, but there is only a small number of empirical studies on the
link between tax structure and economic growth. This study investigates whether there is any
revenue-neutral tax structure adjustment that could be associated with a higher level of income per
capita in the long run.
This is a subject where interest is particularly relevant at the present time, as the recent global
economic recession makes it appealing to reform a countrys tax structure to be "growth-promoting"
while maintaining scal stability. Some countries have recently implemented changes to their tax
structures, in the direction of raising less revenue from income taxes and more revenue from consump-
tion taxes.1 The motivation for such "growth-promoting" tax structure reforms can be summarised
by the following statement:
"No one likes paying taxes and, with tax rates already signicant in most OECD coun-
tries, further rises in rates could be highly distortive and damaging to incentives. How
then should additional tax revenues be raised? In a world of growing international
integration, often described as globalisation, raising taxes on incomes (whether from
earnings or capital) could be particularly harmful to employment, investment, entrepre-
neurship and growth....In addition the burden of taxation could be switched more toward
taxes on consumption (taxed on a destination basis) and recurrent taxes on residential
property."OECDs Current Tax Agenda (June 2010, page 16).
The above statement is closely related to the premise that taxes on income are more distortionary
than taxes on consumption. The choice between the two types of taxes is one of the oldest issues
in taxation policy and has led to much scholarly discussion.2 Nonetheless, the superiority of a
consumption tax over an income tax remains debatable both theoretically and empirically.
Despite growing interest in the growth e¤ects of revenue-neutral tax structure reforms, there
is only a small number of empirical studies on this topic. Early studies (Kneller et al., 1999; and
Widmalm, 2001) use traditional econometric tools, such as pooled Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) and
xed-e¤ects within-groups regressions, to estimate the e¤ects of tax structure measures on income
per capita in the long run. Implicitly, these econometric specications restrict the slope coe¢ cients
1A recent example is the Czech Republic which implemented in 2008 a major overhaul of the personal income
tax, replacing the previous progressive rate schedule with a single 15% rate levied on an enlarged base. This was
accompanied by signicant changes to the corporate income tax and an increase in the concessionary rate of value
added tax applied to many goods and services. There are similar discussions of tax structure reform in Japan and
Korea. There has also been prolonged discussion on shifting the tax base from income to consumption in the United
Kingdom (the Meade Committee Report, 1978) and the United States (Blueprints for Basic Tax Reform, 1977; and
Gordon et al., 2004).
2For example, Henderson (1948), Little (1951), and Corlett and Hague (1953) on the e¤ects of di¤erent taxes on
the supply of e¤ort; Atkinson and Stiglitz (1976), Chamley (1986), Judd (1985), and many others on the design of
optimal tax structure from the perspectives of e¢ ciency and distribution as surveyed in Auerbach (2006); Bankman
and Gri¢ th (1991), and Cunningham (1996) on the e¤ects of di¤erent taxes on saving.
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in the growth equation to be common across countries. If this restriction is invalid, the resulting
estimates may be biased and the inference may be invalid.
To address this issue, Arnold et al. (2011) apply the Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimator,
rst developed by Pesaran, Smith and Shin (1999), to examine the link between tax structure
and growth. Their PMG estimations specify the model in a less restrictive way by relaxing the
homogeneity restriction on some of the slope coe¢ cients in the growth equation. Arnold et al.
(2011) show that given the level of tax revenue as a share of GDP, raising more tax revenue from
taxes on income is associated with lower income per capita in the long run. Moreover, the authors
suggest a "tax and growth ranking" in terms of e¤ects on income per capita, with recurrent taxes on
immovable property at the top of this ranking, followed by consumption and other property taxes,
personal income taxes, and nally corporate income taxes. These ndings lend empirical support to
the policy recommendations as described in the OECDs Current Tax Agenda.
This study contributes to the literature on the link between tax structure and growth by analysing
data for a panel of 17 OECD countries over the period 1970-2004. In particular, we investigate the
robustness of the "tax and growth ranking" suggested in Arnold et al.(2011). We nd that the results
are sensitive to di¤erent model specications. In particular, we nd that the PMG estimation results
are not robust under less restrictive parametric assumptions. This leads us to rigorously test the
validity of the parametric restrictions imposed by the PMG estimator. We show that the Hausman
test (Hausman, 1978), which is often used to guide the choice of whether to impose the homogeneity
restriction on certain coe¢ cients, may have very low power in this context. Moreover we show that
some of the restrictions imposed by the PMG estimator are rejected by an alternative Wald test.
The rest of the paper is structured as follows. Section 2 provides a brief review of theories
and existing empirical studies. Section 3 describes the data set. Section 4 reports the benchmark
PMG estimation results. In Section 5, we check the robustness of the benchmark results by using
a di¤erent sample (Section 5:1), a di¤erent measure of the share of investment in GDP (Section
5:1), and di¤erent specications of time e¤ects (Section 5:2). In Section 6:1, we compare the PMG
estimation results with results obtained using both more restrictive pooled OLS and xed-e¤ects
within-groups estimators, and with those obtained using the less restrictive Mean Groups estimator
(Pesaran and Smith, 1995). The Hausman test results are also reported. In Section 6:2, we apply a
Wald test to examine the validity of the parametric restrictions imposed in the PMG estimations.
In Section 6:3, we report the estimation results that are obtained by imposing common long-run
coe¢ cients only on certain variables and within certain groups of countries that are not rejected by
the Wald test. Section 7 concludes.
2
2 Literature Review
2.1 Related theories
In the framework of the neoclassical growth model, if di¤erent taxes a¤ect the equilibrium capital-
labour ratio di¤erently, the choice of tax structure would a¤ect the steady-state level of income
per capita. Tax structure also matters for short-run growth when the economy approaches its
equilibrium. Although growth solely depends on exogenous technical progress once the economy
reaches its steady state, the transition process can be as long as many decades. Therefore, even the
short-run growth e¤ects of tax structure, if any, cannot be ignored.
Nonetheless, the debate on whether di¤erent types of taxes a¤ect factor supplies di¤erently has
not yet reached a conclusion. For example, concerning the e¤ects of di¤erent taxes on the supply of
e¤ort, Henderson (1948) argues that a tax on consumption has the same e¤ect as an income tax. He
points out that if people work to obtain goods, their incentives to work are a¤ected in the same way,
whether the resources available to them are reduced by an income tax or a consumption tax. Any
advantage of consumption taxes in their e¤ect on incentives is due simply to the fact that a change
towards consumption taxes is usually accompanied by a reduction in the degree of progressivity in
the tax system.
Corlett and Hague (1953) suggest an interesting case in which a reduction in the income tax
rate is compensated by a small ad valorem non-uniform indirect tax in a two goods economy. This
combination makes sure the same tax revenue is raised from the consumer. Their central conclusion
is that in general, the consumer will work harder when the higher rate of tax is levied on the good
which is more complementary with leisure, and vice versa. Therefore, a shift from taxes on income
to taxes on consumption, raising the same revenue from an individual, can either increase or reduce
the supply of e¤ort and real income.
On the other hand, proponents of consumption taxes often argue that income taxes distort
investment. For example, the neoclassical investment theory pioneered by Jorgenson (1963) and
Hall and Jorgenson (1967) suggests that a corporate income tax system which implies higher cost
of capital would lower investment, resulting in a lower capital-labour ratio in the long run. On
the contrary, lowering the tax-adjusted user cost of capital, perhaps by providing more generous
investment tax credits, allowing for faster depreciation of assets, or simply reducing the statutory
corporate income tax rate, can induce additional investment.
Another argument against an income tax is that it may reduce the return to saving, which is
thought to be ine¢ cient because it changes the relative prices of current and future consumption,
and unfair because it discriminates between individuals with di¤erent preferences for saving. Never-
theless, the e¤ects of income taxes on saving behaviour remains an ongoing debate and no conclusion
has been reached yet.3
3Bankman and Gri¢ th (1991), and Cunningham (1996) provide more detailed discussion on this point. Bankman
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Although the link between tax structure and long-run growth is not the focus of the current study,
it is worth mentioning the related literature. One source of technical progress that leads to long-run
growth in the neoclassical growth models is new ideas generated by entrepreneurial activities, as
emphasised in Schumpeter (1942). Cullen and Gordon (2002) show that there are several possible
routes through which taxes can a¤ect the amount of entrepreneurial risk-taking. On the other hand,
in the framework of endogenous growth models, any tax policy that distorts the incentives for factor
accumulation can have a permanent impact on the growth rate. Barro and Sala-I-Martin (1992)
provide a comprehensive survey on the role of scal policy in endogenous growth models. Regarding
the long-run growth e¤ects of tax structure, Rebelo (1991) introduces a endogenous growth model
which addresses the relative distortiveness of di¤erent taxes, whose conclusions lend some support
to the premise that taxes on income are more distortionary than taxes on consumption.
As a summary, despite the long-standing theoretical debate on the choice between an income
tax and a consumption tax, it is not clear whether di¤erent taxes would a¤ect the level of income
in the long run in di¤erent ways. As theories fail to provide clear-cut predictions, the link between
tax structure and growth remains to be analysed empirically.
2.2 Early empirical studies
There is a large body of literature on the growth e¤ects of scal policy, most of which focuses on
macroeconomic variables such as total tax revenue as a share of GDP (Easterly and Rebelo, 1993;
and Fölster and Henrekson, 2001) and total government spending as a share of GDP (Kormendi and
Meguire, 1985; Grier and Tullock, 1987; and Barro, 1989; 1990; 1991). There is increasing interest
in the link between tax structure and growth, but studies remain sparse. Early studies (Kneller,
Bleaney and Gemmell, 1999; and Widmalm, 2001) estimate a regression function as in Equation
(2.1):
Yit = + 
0
0Iit + 
0
1Mit + 
0
2Zit + it (2.1)
i = 1; 2; :::N; and t = 1; 2; :::T
where Y is the growth rate of real per capita GDP; I is a vector of important non-scal growth
determinants suggested by theory, such as the investment-to-GDP ratio and the population growth
rate; M is a vector of scal variables including indicators of tax structure; Z includes additional
control variables such as the ination growth rate;  is the intercept, 00; 
0
1;and 
0
2 are vectors of
coe¢ cients, and it is the error term for country i at time t. Importantly most studies include the
initial level of real per capita income among the explanatory variables. In that case, if the dynamic
model is stable, the long-run solution describes a steady state relationship between other explanatory
variables and the level of real per capita income, rather than the growth rate.4
and Gri¢ th (1991), for example, argue that the di¤erence between an income tax and a consumption tax is only
signicant for riskless saving as savers could adjust their asset portifolios to o¤set the extra tax burden.
4Durlauf , Johnson and Temple (2005) provide a more detailed discussion on this point.
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Both Kneller, Bleaney and Gemmell (1999) and Widmalm (2001) use ve-year averages of the
data to remove the e¤ects of business cycles. Kneller, Bleaney and Gemmell (1999) argue that this
allows them to separate the e¤ects of policy variables on the transition from those on the steady state.
Nevertheless, in their following study (Bleaney et al., 2001), they nd that this period averaging
does not appear to isolate long-run e¤ects fully. Besides, it is generally found that the initial level
of income per capita is negatively related to the current growth rate. Widmalm (2001) points out
that this is an empirical regularity reecting conditional convergence, which is consistent with both
the neoclassical growth model and certain types of endogenous growth models (for example, Rebelo,
1991). Therefore, the estimated coe¢ cients on other explanatory variables in these studies should
not be interpreted as indicating long-run growth e¤ects.
Using panel data from 22 OECD countries over the period 19701995, Kneller, Bleaney and
Gemmell (1999) estimate the e¤ects of di¤erent types of taxes based on Equation (2.1).5 In their
study, Y is the ve-year average annual growth rate of real per capita GDP.6 I includes the initial
level of GDP per capita,7 the investment-to-GDP ratio, and the growth rate of the labour force. M
includes "distortionary" and "non-distortionary" taxes (as a ratio of total GDP), as well as other
elements in the budget.8 Their pooled OLS and xed-e¤ects estimation results suggest that a higher
level of "distortionary" taxes (as a ratio of total GDP) reduces income per capita. Nevertheless, the
benchmark results are not robust when the authors apply Instrumental Variables estimation to deal
with the potential endogeneity of the tax variables.
Kneller, Bleaney and Gemmell (1999) emphasise that the estimated e¤ects of di¤erent types
of taxes may be biased if other elements in the budget, such as expenditures, are omitted. As
suggested by Arnold et al. (2011), one possible solution is to focus on the growth e¤ects of revenue-
neutral changes in tax structure, which avoids the complication that changes in total tax revenue
are reected in changes in public spending.
Widmalm (2001) analyses the growth e¤ects of revenue-neutral changes in tax structure based
on data provided by the OECD Tax Revenue Statistics, which covers 23 OECD countries over the
period 1965-1990. In Widmalm (2001), Y is the ve-year average annual growth rate of real per
capita GDP. I includes the initial level of per capita income, the investment-to-GDP ratio, and
the population growth rate. Z includes variables such as the export-to-GDP ratio, the level and
the variability of the ination rate. M contains total tax revenue as a share of GDP, the share
of a particular tax in total tax revenue, and a measure of progressivity.9 Unlike Kneller, Bleaney
and Gemmell (1999), di¤erent taxes are no longer grouped a priori into "distortionary" or "non-
5Their data is provided by Government Finance Statistics Yearbook, published by the IMF.
6The period between 1970 and 1995 is divided into ve sub-periods and the authors calculate the average annual
growth rate of real per capita GDP for each sub-period.
7Measured at the start of each ve-year sub-period.
8The authors classify di¤erent types of taxes into "distortionary" and "non-distortionary" taxes. Distortionary
taxes are dened as taxes on income and prot, payroll and manpower, property, and social security contribu-
tions. Non-distortionary taxes are dened as those imposed on domestic goods and services. Both are expressed as
percentages of total GDP. Similarly, government expenditures are classied as "productive" and "non-productive"
expenditures, and they are included in M . Other elements of the budget are also included so that the variables in M
sum up to zero.
9Widmalm (2001) measures tax progressivity by estimating the elasticity of total tax revenue to GDP.
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distortionary" taxes. Instead, taxes are grouped into ve categories, namely, taxes on corporate
income, taxes on labour and capital income for individuals, taxes on property, taxes on goods and
services, and taxes on payrolls and social security contributions.10
Using the Extreme Bounds Analysis (Leamer, 1983), Widmalm (2001) nds that there is a robust
negative correlation between the share of personal income taxes and the growth rate of GDP per
capita.11 As the investment-to-GDP ratio is included in the estimation, this result suggests that tax
structure may a¤ect growth through channels other than physical capital accumulation (for example,
human capital accumulation or the supply of e¤ort). Widmalm (2001) nds that taxes on corporate
income as a share of total tax revenue have a positive but fragile correlation with income growth.
The evidence is also fragile in relation to taxes on payrolls and social security contributions, taxes
on property, and taxes on goods and services.
2.3 Recent empirical studies
When estimating a growth equation using traditional econometric tools such as the pooled OLS and
xed-e¤ects estimations, it is implicitly assumed that all slope coe¢ cients in the regression function
are common across groups.12 Countries may have similar long-run growth paths in equilibrium, but
the short-run dynamics may vary. This observation could have important implications, particularly
for models which explicitly distinguish between the short-run dynamics and the long-run growth
path. If it is indeed invalid to impose the restriction of homogeneous coe¢ cients on the short-run
dynamics across countries, the results from the pooled OLS and xed-e¤ects estimations may be
biased, and inference based on these specications may be invalid.
A number of recent studies on the growth e¤ects of tax structure (Gemmell et al., 2007; and
Arnold et al., 201113) apply the Pooled Mean Group (PMG) estimator, rst developed by Pesaran,
Smith and Shin (1999), which allows coe¢ cients on the short-run dynamics to be heterogeneous
across countries. Consider an Autoregressive-Distributed Lag (ADL) model shown below:
yit =
pX
j=1
ijyi;t j +
qX
j=0
0ijXi;t j + i + it (2.2)
i = 1; 2; :::N; and t = 1; 2; :::T
where Xit (k  1) is a vector of explanatory variables for each group i; ij are scalars and 0ij are a
vector of coe¢ cients; i represents the xed e¤ects and it is the error term. Rearranging Equation
10All these tax variables are expressed as percentages of total tax revenue.
11The procedure of the Extreme Bounds Analysis is as follows. First, a base regression with a set of key variables
(such as tax structure variables) is estimated. Then the model is re-estimated by including di¤erent additional
explanatory variables in a systematic way. If the estimated coe¢ cient of a tax structure variable remains signicant
over this procedure, the correlation is said to be "robust" (and "fragile", vice versa ). OLS estimations are applied in
the Extreme Bounds Analysis.
12 i.e. all coe¢ cients except the intercept, which is allowed to vary across countries in the xed-e¤ects (withing
groups) estimator.
13Earlier versions of Arnold et al. (2011) include Arnold (2008 ) and Johansson et al. (2008).
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(2.2), we obtain an Error Correction Model (ECM) as shown in Pesaran, Smith and Shin (1999):
yit = i(yi;t 1 +
0i
i
Xit) +
p 1X
j=1
ijyi;t j +
qX
j=0
0ijXi;t j + i + it (2.3)
where i =  (1  
Pp
j=1 ij), i =
Pq
j=0 ij , 

ij =  
Pp
m=j+1 im (j = 1; 2; :::p   1) and ij =
 Pqm=j+1 im (j = 1; 2; :::q   1). One advantage of the ECM specied in Equation (2.3) is that
it separates the long-run relationship between variables, as captured by the term (yi;t 1 +
0i
i
Xit);
from the short-run adjustment or convergence dynamics. The parameter i measures the speed of
convergence towards the steady state relationship. Note that in Equation (2.3), all coe¢ cients are
i specic. The long-run homogeneity assumption restricts -
0
i
i
to be the same across groups. The
restricted version of Equation (2.3) becomes:
yit = i(yi;t 1   Xit) +
p 1X
j=1
ijyi;t j +
qX
j=0
0ijXi;t j + i + it (2.4)
where  = i =-
0i
i
. By estimating Equation (2.4) using the method of maximum likelihood, we
obtain the PMG estimator.
Arnold et al. (2011) examine the e¤ects of revenue-neutral changes in tax structure on the
long-run level of income per capita, based on panel data for 21 OECD countries over the period
1970-2004 provided by the OECD Tax Revenue Statistics.14 In Arnold et al. (2011), yit is the
annual growth rate of income per capita. The vector Xit includes the investment-to-GDP ratio, the
growth rate of the working-age population, and the average years of schooling of the working-age
population. To capture the e¤ects of revenue-neutral changes in tax structure, total tax revenue
as a share of GDP and shares of di¤erent types of taxes in total tax revenue are also included in
Xit. Taxes are grouped into four major categories, namely, personal income taxes, corporate income
taxes, consumption taxes and property taxes.15
The PMG estimation results in Arnold et al. (2011) are summarised in Table 1.1.16 These
results suggest that shifts in total tax revenue towards property taxes, in particular recurrent taxes
on immovable property, are associated with a higher level of income per capita in the long run. The
authors suggest that if there is a "tax and growth ranking" in terms of the e¤ect of each type of tax
on the long-run level of income per capita, property taxes would come top of this ranking (i.e. taxes
on property tend to reduce income per capita the least), followed by consumption taxes, personal
income taxes and corporate income taxes. Moreover, they nd that this ranking remains robust in
di¤erent model specications with additional explanatory variables, such as the ination rate.17 .
14The 21 countries are: Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Finland, Greece, Ireland, Italy,
Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Portugal, Spain, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, the United
States, and West Germany (until 1990).
15Di¤erent from Widmalm (2001), taxes on labour and capital income for individuals are grouped together with
taxes on payrolls and social security contributions to be termed as personal income taxes.
16Columns 1 and 6 in Table 1.1 are Columns 3 and 4 in Table 6 in Arnold (2008). Columns 2-5 correspond to
Columns 2-5 in Table 1 in Arnold et al. (2011).
17These results are reported in the working paper version of Arnold et al. (2011) (Table 4, Arnold 2008).
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It is important to test the validity of the homogeneous long-run coe¢ cients restriction as imposed
in the PMG estimations. In practice, Hausman tests are often applied. The idea is to compare the
PMG estimates with the Mean Group (MG) estimates of the long-run coe¢ cients in the ECM. The
MG estimates are obtained by estimating Equation (2.3) for each group separately and then aver-
aging the group-specic parameter estimates (Pesaran and Smith, 1995). Under the null hypothesis
that the long-run coe¢ cients are homogeneous across countries, both the PMG and MG estimators
are consistent while the PMG estimator is more e¢ cient. Under the alternative hypothesis, only
the MG estimator provides consistent estimates of the mean value of the heterogeneous long-run
coe¢ cients across groups; the PMG estimator does not. Rejection of the null hypothesis is then
evidence against the validity of this homogeneity restriction.
It remains an empirical question whether the "tax and growth ranking" found in Arnold et al.
(2011) is robust. Moreover, in Arnold et al. (2011), the important issue of testing the validity of the
homogeneity restriction imposed on long-run coe¢ cients is only partially addressed.18 Furthermore,
Pesaran, Smith and Shin (1999) point out that if the MG estimates are associated with large standard
errors, the Hausman test is likely to have low power. A similar concern is raised in Gemmell et al.
(2007).19 This motivates us to rigorously test the validity of the homogeneity restriction imposed
in the PMG estimations in this study.
2.4 Studies focusing on tax rates
It is worth noting that there are also empirical studies that compare the growth e¤ects of di¤erent
tax rates, such as Easterly and Rebelo (1993), Mendoza et al. (1997); and Lee and Gordon (2005).
Although these studies do not analyse explicitly the link between revenue-neutral tax structure
changes and growth outcomes, they still shed light on the current debate.
For example, Lee and Gordon (2005) estimate a growth equation which includes the top statutory
corporate income tax rates, the top average personal income tax rates, average tari¤ rates, and the
average consumption tax rates as explanatory variables. With a 70-country sample, the authors nd
signicantly negative coe¢ cients on statutory corporate tax rates, controlling for other determinants
of economic growth as well as other tax variables.
18There is some discussion of the Hausman test results in the Appendix in Arnold et al. (2011). Arnold (2008)
(Table 6) reports the results of the Hausman test in the basic regression model without tax variables. The null
hypothesis that the long-run coe¢ cients on the investment-to-GDP ratio, the growth rate of working population and
the average years of schooling are common across groups is not rejected by the Hausman test at the 10 per cent level
in this baseline specication.
19Gemmell et al. (2007) analyse the growth e¤ects of tax revenue and government spending using a panel of 17
OECD countries from 1970 to 2004. We do not review this paper in detail because it is not specically concerned
with revenue-neutral tax structure changes, and it is also closely related to Kneller et al. (1999) and Bleaney et al.
(2001).
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2.5 Summary
In summary, growth theories predict that taxes can a¤ect the long-run level of income per capita,
for example, through channels of factor accumulation. Nevertheless, it is not clear whether di¤erent
taxes would a¤ect growth in di¤erent ways. On the other hand, empirical evidence on the relationship
between tax structure and economic growth is somewhat sparse and inconclusive.
Methodologically, early empirical studies implicitly restrict all parameters except intercepts in
the growth equation to be common across countries, which may be invalid if countries have di¤erent
short-run dynamics as the economy approaches the steady state. Recent studies such as Arnold et
al. (2011) relax this restriction by applying the PMG estimator. Nonetheless, a further step towards
a better understanding of the link between tax structure and growth requires one to rigorously test
the validity of the common long-run parameter restriction underlying the PMG estimations.
3 Data description
We combine data from di¤erent sources to obtain a cross-country panel dataset, which covers 17
countries over the period 1970-2004.20 Details of data sources, variable denitions and descriptive
statistics of key variables are provided in Appendix A.
Figure 1.1 illustrates the evolution of the unweighted average real GDP per capita, physical
capital investment as a share of GDP, years of education and the growth rate of the working-age
population over the sample period.21 On average, there is a clear upward trend in real GDP per
capita and a downward trend in the investment share. Average years of education of the working-age
population experienced a steady increase from 9 years in 1970 to 12 years in 2004. There remains
mild positive growth in the working-age population on average, but the magnitude remains small
throughout the sample period.22
On average, tax revenue accounts for more than 30 per cent of total GDP in the sampled countries.
The average total tax revenue as a share of GDP is highest in Sweden (around 47 per cent) and
lowest in Japan (around 25 per cent). Tax structures are measured by the shares of major tax
revenues in total tax revenue. Following Arnold et al. (2011), we distinguish between four main
sources of tax revenue, namely, personal income taxes, corporate income taxes, consumption taxes
20The 17 OECD countries are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Canada, Denmark, France, Finland, Greece, Ireland,
Japan, Netherlands, New Zealand, Norway, Sweden, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and the United States. Com-
pared with Arnold et al. (2011), there are four countries that are not included. These four countries are West Germany
(until 1990), Italy, Spain and Portugal. The main reason for choosing a smaller panel of countries is that we include
only countries with longer available time series, which is essential to conducting the Mean Group estimations and the
PMG estimations allowing for cross-section dependence.
21We use "investment" as a shorthand for physical capital investment in the rest of the paper.
22The average growth rate of working-age population increased from 0.62 per cent in 1990 to 0.95 per cent in 1991
(mainly due to a large increase in the working-age population in New Zealand in 1991), and it dropped to 0.66 per
cent in 1992. This pattern is reected as a spike in the gure for average population growth rates.
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Figure 3.1: Real GDP per capita, physical and human capital accumulation, and population growth
over time
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and property taxes. Details of the classication of di¤erent types of taxes are provided in Appendix
A.
Figure 1.2 plots the unweighted average shares of income taxes (personal and corporate income
taxes together) as well as those of consumption and property taxes in total tax revenue for the 17
countries over the period 1970-2004. It reveals that for a typical country, taxes on income account for
around 58 to 65 per cent of total tax revenue between 1970 and 2004. In 2004, the share of income
taxes in total tax mix exceeded 50 per cent in all 17 countries, with the lowest share in Ireland
(around 54 per cent) and the highest share in Sweden (around 70 per cent). Appendix B illustrates
the evolution of the composition of total tax revenue for individual countries. The dominance of
income taxes over other types of taxes is observed in the majority of the 17 countries during the
sample period.23
In Figure 1.2, we observe an initial increase in taxes on income from around 58 per cent of total
tax revenue in 1970 to around 63 per cent in 1974. This is mirrored by an initial drop in the share
of consumption and property taxes in total tax revenue. Figure 1.3 shows that the initial jump in
the share of income taxes in total tax revenue is largely driven by the increase in personal income
taxes. Appendix B shows that this pattern is observed in many countries such as Belgium, Finland,
23Greece and Ireland during the early 1970s were exceptions with consumption taxes accounting for a slightly larger
share of total tax revenue than income taxes.
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Figure 3.2: Income taxes vs. consumption and property taxes
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Ireland, Japan, New Zealand and Switzerland.
Further disaggregating personal income taxes into taxes on individual income (including wages
and salaries, prots and capital gains), social contributions and taxes on payrolls, we can see that
following an initial jump in the early 1970s, taxes on individual income as a share of total tax revenue
declined gradually over time after the early 1980s. This decline is partly o¤set by the growing share
of social security contributions during the same period. We do not illustrate the evolution of payroll
taxes that do not confer entitlement to social benets, as their share in total tax revenue is only
around 1 per cent throughout the sample period.
As shown in Figure 1.3, the average share of corporate income taxes in total tax revenue dropped
slightly from early 1970s until early 1990s. This downward trend was reversed around the year 1993
when it began to increase until the year 2000. On average, corporate income taxes account for
around 7 to 11 per cent of total tax revenue. Nevertheless, this average hides a considerable spread
across countries as revealed in Appendix B. For example, corporate income taxes were the second
most important source of tax revenue in Japan between the 1970s and the early 1990s. In the year
2004, corporate income taxes account for only 5 per cent of total tax revenue in Austria but they
account for 23 per cent of total tax revenue in Norway. Apart from the spread in statutory rates of
corporate income taxes, these di¤erences can be partly explained by features including institutional
factors, the degree to which rms in a country are incorporated, taxation of oil revenues and the
erosion of the corporate income tax base.24
Figure 1.4 shows that the average share of consumption taxes (general consumption taxes plus
specic consumption taxes) in total tax revenue fell from 34 to 29 per cent between 1970 and 2004,
although consumption taxes remain as the second most important source for tax revenue in most
countries.25 On average, property taxes account for around 5-7 per cent of total tax revenue.26
Nevertheless, the share of property taxes in total tax revenue is higher in some countries than in
24For example, as a consequence of tax avoidance, generous depreciation schemes or other instruments to postpone
the taxation of earned prots (OECD Tax Revenue Statistics 2009).
25Again, Japan between the 1970s and the early 1990s is an exception.
26There is a spike in the graph for average property taxes as a share of total tax revenue in the year 1996 and this
is largely driven by the increase in property taxes in Greece in that year.
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Figure 3.3: Personal income and corporate income taxes
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others, as revealed in Appendix B. For example, the average share of property taxes in total tax
revenue over the period 1970-2004 exceeds 10 per cent in Canada, the United Kingdom and the
United States. On the other hand, this gure is less than 3 per cent in Finland, Norway, and
Sweden.
Appendix B shows that despite uctuations in the absolute percentages of di¤erent types of
taxes in total tax revenue, the relative importance of di¤erent types of taxes remains stable in most
countries over the period 1970-2004, with personal income taxes as the most important source of tax
revenue, followed by consumption taxes, corporate income taxes and property taxes. Furthermore,
while the share of income taxes in total tax revenue becomes smaller towards the end of the sample
period in some countries (for example, Netherlands and New Zealand), it increases in other countries
(for example, Ireland).
4 Benchmark estimations
4.1 Model
The central question of the current study is, does there exist a revenue-neutral tax structure change
that could shift the growth path upwards? To answer this question, we restrict ourselves to the
12
Figure 3.4: Consumption and property taxes
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framework of the neoclassical growth model and focus on the long-run relationship between the level
of output per worker and tax structure variables.27 We consider a human capital-augmented Solow
model with a standard Cobb-Douglas production function.28 In period t, output Y is given by:
Yt = K

t H

t (AtLt)
1   (4.1)
where K and H are physical and human capital, respectively. L is labour and A captures the level
of technology.  and  are the partial elasticities of output with respect to physical and human
capital. The paths of these variables are described by the following equations:
:
k = sky   (n+ g + d)k
:
h = shy   (n+ g + d)h
y = kh
:
A = gA
:
L = nL (4.2)
where y = Y=AL, k = K=AL and h = H=AL are quantities per e¤ective unit of labour. sk and sh
stand for the shares of physical and human capital investment in total output. n is the growth rate
of labour, g is the rate of exogenous technological change and d is the depreciation rate of physical
and human capital.
In equilibrium,
:
k = 0 and
:
h = 0. From Equation (4.2), it can be shown that:
k =
sky
n+ g + d
h =
shy
n+ g + d
(4.3)
27 It is not the aim of the current study to distinguish between the neoclassical and the endogenous growth models.
Kocherlakota and Yi (1997) provide a good reference on how to empirically distinguish between the two models when
the growth e¤ects of taxes are concerned.
28The formulation of the model in this study is largely based on Arnold et al. (2007).
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where k, h and y are the quantities in the steady state. By solving Equation (4.3), we obtain
that:
k =
 
s1 k s

h
n+ g + d
! 1
1  
h =

sk s
1 
h
n+ g + d
 1
1  
(4.4)
The steady state level of output per e¤ective worker can be expressed as:
y = (k)(h) =
 
s1 k s

h
n+ g + d
! 
1  
(h) (4.5)
Taking the logarithms of the above equation, it is shown in Appendix 2 that the solution for
ln y is:
ln y =

1   ln sk +

1   lnh
   
1   ln(n+ g + d) (4.6)
Furthermore, the transitional dynamics can be expressed by the following equation (Romer,
1996):
d ln yt
dt
=   (ln yt   ln y) (4.7)
where  = (1      )(g + n + d). Under the assumption that  +  < 1, the transitional path of
output can be written as:
ln yt   ln yt s =  ' () (ln yt s   ln y) (4.8)
where s is an arbitrary lag and ' () = e s   1. Substituting Equation (4.6) into Equation (4.8),
we obtain the following expression:
ln yt   ln yt s =  ' () [ln yt s   
1   ln sk  

1   lnh

+

1   ln(n+ g + d)] (4.9)
If we take s = 1, it can be further shown that
ln eyt   ln eyt 1 =  ' () [ln eyt 1   
1   ln sk  

1   lnh

+

1   ln(n+ g + d)] +
eVt (4.10)
where ey = YL , and eVt = ' () lnA0 + g [' () t  ' () + 1].29 The approximations of sk, h and
29The calculation is shown in Appendix C.
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ln(n+ g + d) are explained in Appendix C.
Next, we add tax structure measures to the right-hand side of Equation (1.14). It is conventional
to use the Error Correction Model (ECM) for PMG estimations. One advantage of the ECM is that
it distinguishes between the long-run growth path and the short-run convergence dynamics. It is
this feature that enables us to examine the link between the long-run level of income per capita and
tax structure, and at the same time to impose di¤erent homogeneity restrictions on the long-run and
short-run parameters. As in Arnold et al. (2011), we include rst di¤erences of all the explanatory
variables to control for the short-run dynamics.30 The benchmark regression model is then specied
as in Equation (4.11):
 ln eyi;t =  i
0@ln eyi;t 1   1 ln ski;t   2 lnhi;t   3ni;t   mX
j=4
jTSi;t
1A
+1;i ln s
k
i;t + 2;i lnhi;t + 3;ini;t +
mX
j=4
j;iTSi;t
+0i  Time E¤ects + i + "i;t (4.11)
where i is the subscript for each country. TS stands for a vector of indicators of tax structure,
including total tax revenue (as a share of total GDP) and a combination of the tax share variables.
i is a vector of coe¢ cients on the time e¤ects. i is the country-specic intercept and "i;t is the
error term which is assumed to follow a normal distribution. In our benchmark regressions, we follow
Arnold et al. (2011) in using ve-year period dummies to control for non-linear time e¤ects.31 In the
benchmark PMG estimations, we restrict all the long-run coe¢ cients (1; 2:::m) to be common
across countries but allow the short-run coe¢ cients (1;i,2;i...m;i), the coe¢ cients on the time
e¤ects (i) and the convergence rates (i) to take di¤erent values for each country.
4.2 Benchmark results
Table 7.2 reports the benchmark PMG estimates of the long-run coe¢ cients (b1; b2:::bm) and
the estimated average speed of convergence across countries (b = 117P17i=1 bi); based on Equation
(4.11).32 Heteroskedasticity-robust standard errors are reported. Column 7 reports the basic results
when no tax variable is included in the growth equation. Columns 8-12 report the results when
di¤erent combinations of tax shares are included.
The unweighted average of country-specic convergence rates is in the range between -0.2 and
-0.3 in di¤erent specications. As expected, the estimated long-run coe¢ cients on physical and
human capital are both positive and signicantly di¤erent from zero, while that on the growth rate
30This is the same model specication as in Arnold et al. (2011). We use it here for comparability. Admittedly,
richer dynamic specications could be considered with annual data.
31The construction of the ve-year period dummy variables is explained in Appendix A.
32These PMG results are computed using the xtpmg command in Stata.
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of the working-age population is negative and signicant. The estimated coe¢ cient on total tax
revenue (as a share of GDP) is negative in all models but it is not always signicant.
In Column 8, we distinguish between personal income taxes and corporate income taxes. We
nd that the share of personal income taxes and that of corporate income taxes in total tax revenue
are both negatively associated with the long-run level of income per capita. A standard Wald test
does not reject the null hypothesis that the estimated long-run coe¢ cients on these two types of
taxes are equal.33
Column 9 combines consumption and property taxes together and treats income taxes (personal
income taxes and corporate income taxes together) as the omitted group. The signicant positive
coe¢ cient on the combined consumption and property tax share suggests that at a given level of
total tax revenue (as a share of GDP), raising more of this revenue from these two types of taxes is
associated with a higher level of income per capita in the long run. In Column 10, we distinguish
between consumption taxes and property taxes. The estimated coe¢ cients on the two tax share
variables are both positive and signicant, however, this positive association with the long-run level
of income per capita is estimated to be more prominent for property taxes.34
It is suggested by Arnold et al. (2011) that shifts in tax revenue towards recurrent taxes on
immovable property are the most "growth-friendly". This is not supported by our results in Column
11, when we further disaggregate total property taxes into recurrent taxes on immovable property
and "other property taxes".35 The estimated long-run coe¢ cient on "other property taxes" is not
only larger in magnitude but also signicantly larger than that on recurrent taxes on immovable
property.36
In Column 12, we compare personal income taxes, corporate income taxes and consumption
taxes with property taxes as the omitted category. The estimated long-run coe¢ cients on these
three taxes are all negative and signicant, indicating that shifts in tax revenue from these taxes to
property taxes are associated with higher levels of income per capita in the steady state. Moreover,
the Wald test results suggest that there is no signicant di¤erence between personal income taxes
and corporate income taxes, but both have a long-run coe¢ cient that is signicantly lower than that
on consumption taxes.37
33The Wald test statistic for this restriction, which has a 2 (1) distribution under the null hypothesis of equal
coe¢ cients, is 1.03. The marginal signicance level (p-value) at which the null hypothesis would be rejected is 0.31.
34The Wald test rejects the null hypothesis that the estimated coe¢ cient on consumption taxes equals that on
property taxes at the 1 percent level, with  2 (1)= 9.70 and a p-value of 0.002.
35The taxes categorised as "other property taxes" include: recurrent taxes on net wealth, taxes on estates, inheri-
tances and gifts, taxes on nancial and capital transactions, non-recurrent taxes and other recurrent taxes on property
(OECD Tax Revenue Statistics classication).
36The Wald test rejects the null hypothesis of equal long-run coe¢ cients on recurrent taxes on immovable property
and "other property taxes", with a p-value of 0.000.
37The null hypothesis that the estimated coe¢ cients on personal income taxes, corporate income taxes and con-
sumption taxes are all equal is rejected by the Wald test at the 1 percent level, with 2(2) = 31.52 and a p-value of
0.00. The null hypothesis that the estimated coe¢ cients on personal income taxes and corporate income taxes are
equal is not rejected at the 10 percent, level with 2(1) = 2.41 and a p-value of 0.121.
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4.3 Comparison with Arnold et al. (2011)
Comparing Table 1.1 and 7.2, it can be seen that the estimated long-run coe¢ cients on the investment
share are reasonably close. Di¤erences are more prominent in the estimated long-run coe¢ cients on
human capital and on population growth. In Arnold et al. (2011), total tax revenue (as a share of
GDP) has a negative and signicant estimated coe¢ cient, which remains robust throughout various
model specications. In contrast, the corresponding estimate in Table 7.2 is not always signicant
and is sensitive to di¤erent specications.
More importantly, both studies nd that raising more government revenue from taxes on income
is associated with a lower steady-state level of income per capita. However, Arnold et al. (2011)
nd that corporate income taxes are less "growth friendly" than personal income taxes, which is not
supported by our benchmark PMG results. We also do not nd that recurrent taxes on immovable
property are the most "growth friendly".
It is necessary to clarify several di¤erences between Arnold et al. (2011) and the current study.
Firstly, we use a di¤erent sample of countries. Secondly, we use total gross xed capital formation
(as a share of GDP) to measure the investment share, while Arnold et al. (2011) use non-housing
xed capital formation (as a share of GDP). Thirdly, we may construct the ve-year period dummies
in a di¤erent way.
The importance of these di¤erences will be explored in the next section. In Section 5.1, we
use a larger sample of countries. We also use non-housing xed capital formation (as a share of
GDP) as an alternative measure of the investment share. Section 5.2 considers three alternative
specications of the time e¤ects. Section 5.2.1 presents the estimation results when a di¤erent set of
ve-year period dummies are included in the specication. Section 5.2.2 considers a more restrictive
specication with country-specic linear trends. Section 5.2.3 controls for cross-section dependence,
using the estimator proposed by Pesaran (2006). These variations also serve as robustness checks of
our benchmark results.
5 Robustness checks
5.1 Alternative sample and proxy for the investment share
First, we examine the robustness of the benchmark regression results by using panel data for 21
OECD countries as in Arnold et al. (2011).38 Table 7.3 summarises the results from the PMG
estimations.39 Comparing with corresponding columns in Table 7.2, we observe a similar pattern.
In particular, contrary to Arnold et al. (2011) but consistent with Table 7.2, we nd that there is
38We add four countries (West Germany until 1990, Italy, Spain and Portugal) to the original set of 17 countries.
39We were not able to obtain a full set of results as in Table 7.2 because the likelihood function becomes non-concave
in several cases. The Newton-Raphson algorithm is used for maximisation.
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no signicant di¤erence between corporate income taxes and personal income taxes (Column 16).40
Second, we use non-housing xed capital formation (as a share of GDP) as an alternative proxy
for the investment share.41 Table 7.4 shows that using this di¤erent measure does not greatly a¤ect
the estimated mean convergence rate, the estimated long-run coe¢ cient on human capital or that
on the population growth rate. Now, there is some evidence that corporate income taxes are less
"growth friendly" than personal income taxes in Columns 18.42 Nonetheless, there is no evidence
that recurrent taxes on immovable property are the most "growth friendly" (Column 21).
These two exercises suggest that the general pattern in our benchmark results are not very
sensitive to di¤erent samples or regressors. Moreover, the discrepancies between the results in
Arnold et al. (2011) and the current study cannot be fully explained by these di¤erent choices of
sample and variables.
5.2 Di¤erent specications of the time e¤ects
In this section, we consider alternative specications of the time e¤ects. First, we use an alternative
set of ve-year period dummies to control for non-linear time e¤ects. Second, we apply a more
restrictive specication by including only a linear trend for each country instead of ve-year period
dummies. Finally, following Pesaran (2006), we allow for cross-section dependence.
5.2.1 5.2.1 A di¤erent set of ve-year period dummies
Table 7.5 presents the PMG estimation results when an alternative set of ve-year period dummies
is included to control for the time e¤ects. Previously we have included a dummy variable for each
of the periods 1970-75, 1976-80, 1981-85, ... , 2001-04. Now instead we include a dummy variable
for each of the periods 1970-74, 1975-79, 1980-84, ... , 2000-04. We can see that the results in Table
7.2 are quite sensitive to how the ve-year period dummies are constructed.
Columns 24 and 25 show that shifts from taxes on income to those on consumption and property
do not appear to a¤ect the long-run level of income per capita. Nevertheless, when we distinguish
between consumption taxes and property taxes, we nd the results in these rst two columns may be
largely driven by consumption taxes, which do not appear to have signicantly di¤erent e¤ects from
40 In Column 16, we cannot estimate exactly the same model as in Column 12 because the likelihood function
becomes non-concave in the PMG estimation. In Column 12, property taxes are treated as the omitted group while
in Column 16, we treat personal income taxes as the omitted group. The estimated coe¢ cient on corporate income
taxes is insignicantly di¤erent from zero, indicating that imposing the same coe¢ cient on personal income taxes and
corporate income taxes would be a valid restriction.
41We do not use non-housing xed capital formation in our benchmark specication because more observations
would be lost. For example, this data is not available for Belgium in OECD National Accounts (Belgium is included
in Arnold et al. 2011, suggesting that the authors may have had access to a di¤erent data source). The likelihood
function also becomes non-concave for this smaller sample in many cases when we apply di¤erent specications of the
time e¤ects.
42 In Column 18, the Wald test of equal coe¢ cients on personal income taxes and corporate income taxes yields a
p-value of 0.005.
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income taxes in this specication.43 We continue to nd that raising a higher share of tax revenue
from property taxes is associated with a signicantly higher level of income per capita (Column 26),
and again this is largely driven by "other property taxes" (Column 27).
We observed previously that our PMG estimation results are somewhat closer to those in Arnold
et al. (2011) when we measure the investment share using non-housing xed capital formation (as
a ratio of GDP). Nevertheless, the results based on this alternative proxy for investment are also
sensitive to di¤erent ways of constructing the ve-year period dummies, as shown in Table 7.6. In
particular, there is now no evidence that the e¤ects of personal income taxes and corporate income
taxes are di¤erent from each other (Columns 30 and 34).44 We also nd no evidence that the e¤ects
of consumption taxes are signicantly di¤erent from those of income taxes.45 On the other hand, we
continue to nd that shifts of tax revenue towards property taxes, and particularly towards other
property taxes, are associated with a higher level of income per capita.
5.2.2 5.2.2 Linear trends
In Figure 1.1, we observe an upward trend in real GDP per capita and years of education, and a
downward trend in the investment-to-GDP ratio. This observation motivates us to include it in
Equation (4.11), where t is a linear time trend and i is a country-specic coe¢ cient. Table 7.7
summarises the PMG estimation results under this model specication. In comparison with Table
7.2, some di¤erences are observed. Firstly, the magnitude of the estimated coe¢ cient on human
capital becomes much smaller. Secondly, the estimated coe¢ cient on total tax revenue (as a share
of GDP) is now strongly negative and less sensitive to model specications.
Consistent with the benchmark results in Table 7.2, we continue to nd that shifts in tax revenue
towards property taxes (Column 40), and particularly towards other property taxes (Column 39) are
associated with a higher long-run level of output per capita. In contrast to the benchmark results,
Columns 38-40 here suggest that consumption taxes are no "better", if not "worse", than income
taxes. For example, in Column 40, the estimated coe¢ cients on personal income taxes, corporate
income taxes and consumption taxes continue to be negative. Here, the estimated coe¢ cient on
consumption taxes is not signicantly di¤erent from those on the two income taxes.46
43 In Column 26, the estimated long-run coe¢ cient on consumption taxes is negative and marginally signicant. In
Column 28, the Wald test cannot reject the null hypothesis of equal long-run coe¢ cients on personal inome taxes,
corporate income taxes and consumption taxes (p-value equals 0.115).
44 In Column 30, the Wald test of equal long-run coe¢ cients on personal income taxes and corporate income taxes
yields a p-value of 0.333. In Column 34, the Wald test of equal long-run coe¢ cients on personal income taxes and
corporate income taxes yields a p-value of 0.675.
45 In Column 32, the estimated long-run coe¢ cient on consumption taxes is insignicantly di¤erent from zero. In
Column 34, the Wald test that the estimated long-run coe¢ cients on personal income taxes, corporate income taxes
and consumption taxes are equal yields a p-value of 0.661.
46The Wald test of equal long-run coe¢ cients on personal income taxes, corporate income taxes and consumption
taxes yields a p-value of 0.350.
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5.2.3 5.2.3 Allowing for cross-section dependence
It is known that without controlling for cross-section dependence (i.e. correlation across countries
in the error term for the same period), estimation based on macro-level cross-country panel data
may be biased. Such bias would arise if countries tend to be a¤ected by some common shocks, such
as business cycle uctuations. which may also be correlated with some of the included explanatory
variables.
Pesaran (2006) suggests a simple procedure to allow for a form of cross-section dependence
with a multiplicative factor structure. Analogously to allowing each country to have its own slope
coe¢ cients on the observed explanatory variables, this allows each country to have its own slope
coe¢ cient on an unobserved common factor. This form of cross-country dependence can be allowed
for by including the time means 1N
PN
i=1  ln yi;t and
1
N
PN
i=1Xi;t as additional regressors in the
ECM, where  ln yi;t is the dependent variable and Xi;t denotes the vector of all explanatory vari-
ables. Countries are allowed to have heterogeneous responses towards the common factors. This
formulation can also be regarded as a exible way of introducing trends.
Table 7.8 summarises the PMG estimation results allowing for cross-section dependence in this
way. We are only able to estimate the rst four models in Table 7.2, as the likelihood function
becomes non-concave in other cases. Now, the estimated average convergence rate is found to be
higher, in the range between -0.344 and -0.593, while the corresponding estimate in Table 7.2 is in
the range between -0.216 to -0.295. The estimated coe¢ cient on human capital is insignicant in
Column 41 and becomes signicantly negative when more control variables are added. The estimated
coe¢ cient on total tax revenue (as a share of GDP) is negative and signicant in these specications.
Allowing for cross-section dependence in this way, there is some support for favouring personal
income taxes over corporate income taxes (Column 42) but there is no evidence that a shift in tax
revenue between taxes on income and taxes on consumption a¤ects the level of income per capita in
the long run (Column 43). Nevertheless, we continue to nd a positive association between the share
of property taxes in total tax revenue and the level of income per capita in the long run (Column
44). In this specication there is also a suggestion that the e¤ects of taxes on consumption may be
worse than those of taxes on income.
5.3 Summary
In this section, we check the robustness of the benchmark regression results by using a di¤erent
sample, a di¤erent proxy for the investment share and di¤erent specications of the time e¤ects.
The benchmark estimation results are rather sensitive to these variations. The only robust result
appears to be that shifts in total tax revenue towards property taxes away from other taxes are
associated with a higher level of income per capita in the long run. Relative to property taxes,
the shares of personal income taxes, corporate income taxes and consumption taxes in total tax
revenue are all found to be negatively related to the long-run level of income per capita. However,
the ranking among these three taxes is not clear. Overall, in contrast to Arnold et al. (2011), we
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obtain no strong evidence for favouring personal income taxes over corporate income taxes, or for
favouring consumption taxes over income taxes.
Table 7.9 demonstrates that shifts in total tax revenue towards property taxes are indeed as-
sociated with a higher long-run level of income per capita in these di¤erent model specications.
Therefore, in the next section, we will focus on the role of property taxes and proceed to test the
validity of the common long-run coe¢ cients restriction imposed in the PMG estimations.
6 Testing the validity of imposing homogeneity on long-run
parameters
6.1 PMG, unweighted and weighted MG estimations
Up to this point, we have only reported results from the PMG estimations, which impose homogeneity
on the long-run coe¢ cients in Equation (1.15). It is important to examine whether estimation results
are sensitive to di¤erent parametric assumptions. For example, the pooled OLS and xed-e¤ects
within-groups estimators restrict both long-run and short-run coe¢ cients (1, 2:::m, , 1, 2:::m
and ) in Equation (4.11) to be homogeneous across countries. On the other hand, the Mean Group
(MG) estimator allows all coe¢ cients (1;i, 2;i:::m;i, i, 1;i, 2;i:::m;i and i) to be country-
specic. In this case we may be interested in the central tendency of the distribution of the estimated
coe¢ cients across countries, as reected in some estimate of the mean.
The unweighted MG estimates are obtained by simply averaging the country-specic estimates
of each coe¢ cient. One potential drawback of the unweighted MG estimator is that they may be
very sensitive to the presence of (possibly very imprecise) country-specic estimates with extreme
values. The outlier-robust variant of the MG estimator (Bond, Leblebicioglu and Schiantarelli, 2010)
addresses this issue by putting smaller weights on country-specic estimates with extreme values
relative to the sample distribution. In practice, we rst obtain country-specic estimates of each
coe¢ cient in separate estimations for each country. Then, we use a robust regression (Hamilton,
1991a) on a constant to calculate a weighted average for each coe¢ cient in Equation (1.15).47
Table 7.10 summarises the PMG, weighted and unweighted MG, pooled OLS and xed-e¤ects
within-groups estimates of the (mean) long-run coe¢ cients and the (mean) speed of convergence
based on Equation (4.11) when our measure of property taxes as a share of total tax revenue is
included in the specication. We specify the time e¤ect to be a linear trend in these and all
subsequent estimations. The PMG and MG estimations allow for heterogeneous responses to the
47Following the country-by-country estimations, we regress the country-specic estimates for each variable on a
constant using the STATA command "rreg", which generates the weighted average estimate by putting small weights
on country-specic estimates with extreme values. Standard errors are calculated by the formula: b = qPi wib2i ,
where bi is the country-specic heteroskedasticity-robust standard error for a certain estimated coe¢ cient, and wi is
the weight computed in the robust regression.
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linear time e¤ect, while the pooled OLS and xed-e¤ects within-groups estimations restrict the
responses to be common across countries. It can be seen in Table 7.10 that the signicant positive
association between income per capita and the share of property taxes in total tax revenue is only
found in the PMG estimations. Allowing all coe¢ cients to be heterogeneous across countries, both
the weighted and unweighted MG estimations yield positive mean long-run coe¢ cients on property
taxes, but with very large standard errors. When all (slope) coe¢ cients are restricted to be common
across countries, the pooled OLS (and within-groups xed e¤ects) regressions yield negative but
insignicant long-run coe¢ cients on property taxes.
The central question now is whether it is valid to restrict the long-run coe¢ cients to be common
across countries, as in Equation (1.15) and as imposed by the PMG estimator. Previous studies try
to answer this question by comparing the PMG estimates with the unweighted MG estimates of the
(mean) long-run coe¢ cients, using the Hausman test. Under the null hypothesis that the long-run
coe¢ cients are homogeneous across countries, both the PMG and MG estimators are consistent
while the PMG estimators are more e¢ cient. Under the alternative hypothesis, however, only the
MG estimator is consistent. Rejection of the null hypothesis is evidence against the validity of
restricting the long-run coe¢ cients to be the same across countries.
Table 7.11a reports the Hausman test results comparing the PMG with the unweighted MG
estimates of the (mean) long-run coe¢ cients. The Hausman test statistic for all ve coe¢ cients
jointly has a 2(5) distribution under the null. The test statistic is 5.1, with a p-value of 0.404.
Hence, the joint validity of the homogeneity restrictions imposed on these ve long-run coe¢ cients
is not rejected. Considering the ve restrictions individually, there is some doubt about the validity
of the common long-run parameter restriction for the physical investment share (t-statistic = 1.906;
p-value = 0.059). Table 7.11b compares the PMG and weighted MG estimates of each (mean)
long-run coe¢ cient individually.48 Again there is some concern about the validity of the common
long-run parameter restriction for the physical investment share (t-statistic =1.731; p-value =0.086).
The restriction of common long-run coe¢ cients is not rejected by these Hausman tests for any of
the other variables.
It is worth noting that the weighted and unweighted MG estimates of the mean long-run co-
e¢ cients on human capital and property taxes in Table 7.11 are very imprecise. Therefore, the
Hausman test may have low power, which could incorrectly lead to the acceptance of the homo-
geneous long-run coe¢ cients restriction. The low power of the Hausman test has been questioned
previously by Im, Pesaran and Shin (1999) and Gemmell et al. (2007), but is not emphasised in
Arnold et al. (2011). This motivates us to use an alternative method to examine the validity of the
homogeneity restriction imposed on long-run parameters.
48We were not able to compute the joint Hausman test using the weighted MG estimator, as this would require
evaluation of the full covariance matrix for this estimator, not only the stnadard errors for each coe¢ cient.
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6.2 Alternative test of the homogeneity restriction
To further examine the validity of imposing the homogeneity restriction on the long-run coe¢ cients,
we estimate a dynamic model specied as Equation (6.1):
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where i is the country-specic speed of convergence and ij =
ij
i
(i = 1; 2; :::17; j = 1; 2; :::5) are
country-specic long-run coe¢ cients on the investment-to-GDP share, human capital, the growth
rate of the working-age population, total tax revenue (as a share of GDP) and property taxes
(as a share of total tax revenue), respectively. i is the country-specic coe¢ cient on the linear
time trend, and i is the country-specic intercept. We can estimate Equation (6.1) by OLS and
obtain standard errors that are robust to heteroskedasticity. Country-specic long-run coe¢ cients
and their associated standard errors are then obtained by non-linear transformation of the basic
estimated coe¢ cients.49 Then, we can test whether the long-run coe¢ cients ij on a certain variable
(i = 1; 2:::17) are the same across all countries, or across subsets of countries, using a standard Wald
test.
Country-specic estimates of the long-run coe¢ cients and the speed of convergence in Equation
(6.1) are summarised in Table 7.12. The last column reports the p-values for the Wald test of equal
long-run coe¢ cients across all countries for each variable, individually. The Wald test does not
reject the null hypothesis of equal long-run coe¢ cients on the physical investment share across the
17 countries. Similarly, we cannot reject the null hypothesis of equal long-run coe¢ cients on the
working-age population growth rate and on total tax revenue (as a share of GDP), respectively.
However, the null hypothesis that the long-run coe¢ cients on human capital investment are
equal is rejected by the Wald test at the 1 per cent level, indicating that it is invalid to restrict this
coe¢ cient to be the same across all 17 countries. Note that the mean long-run coe¢ cient on human
capital investment was imprecisely estimated with a large standard error in both the weighted and
the unweighted MG estimations and hence, the Hausman test of this restriction did not reject the
null in either Table 7.11a or Table 7.11b. This exercise illustrates the low power of the Hausman
49 In practice, this is achieved by the STATA command "nlcom", using the delta method.
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test when the MG estimates are imprecise. Furthermore, the p-value of the Wald test of common
long-run coe¢ cients on the property tax share is only 0.231, which is lower than the p-values for the
other three variables, and indicates some concern about the validity of imposing this parameter to
be common across all 17 countries.
6.3 Relaxing the homogeneity restriction
Based on the ndings in the previous section, it appears reasonable to impose the long-run coe¢ cients
on the investment share, the growth rate of the working-age population and total tax revenue (as
a share of GDP) to be common across all countries (by imposing i;1 = 1; i;3 = 3; i;4 = 4 for
i = 1; :::; 17 in Equation 6.1), while allowing the long-run coe¢ cients on human capital investment
and property taxes to be country-specic. Table 7.13 presents the estimation results based on this
restricted version of Equation (6.1).
The upper panel reports country-specic long-run coe¢ cients on human capital investment and
the property tax share. The lower panel reports the common long-run coe¢ cients on the physical
investment share, the growth rate of the working-age population and total tax revenue (as a share
of GDP). The last column reports the Wald test results. Again, the Wald test rejects the null
hypothesis of common long-run coe¢ cients on human capital investment at the 1 per cent level.
The Wald test of common long-run coe¢ cients on the property tax share has a p-value of 0.219.
A closer examination of the country-specic estimates for the property tax variable in Table
7.13 reveals that there is still a considerable amount of heterogeneity across countries. In fact,
for only three countries do we estimate a positive and signicant long-run coe¢ cient on the share
of property taxes (Finland, Ireland and the UK) while for all other countries we nd insignicant
estimates. Nonetheless, in terms of this coe¢ cient, some countries appear to be more similar to each
other. This observation leads us to restrict countries within certain groups to have a common long-
run coe¢ cient on the share of property taxes. We split the 17 OECD countries into three sub-groups.
The rst group includes Finland, Ireland and the UK. The second group includes Austria, Belgium,
France, Greece, Japan, Netherlands and the US, all of which have a positive but insignicant long-
run coe¢ cient on property taxes in Table 7.13. The third group includes the remaining 7 countries
which have negative but insignicant estimates. It is worth noting that the Wald tests of common
long-run coe¢ cients on property taxes within these sub-groups all yield higher p-values than that
when we pool the 17 countries together.50
In Table 7.14, Column 55 reports the PMG estimation results when all long-run coe¢ cients are
assumed to be common across all 17 countries. Column 56 presents the results when the long-run
coe¢ cients on both human capital investment and property taxes are allowed to be country-specic.
Relaxing the homogeneity restrictions on these two variables, the unweighted average estimates of
the long-run coe¢ cients on property taxes and human capital investment both become insignicant.
50The p-value of the Wald test statistic is 0.455 for Group 1 countries, 0.992 for Group 2 countries and 0.930 for
Group 3 countries, much higher than the p-value when we pool the 17 countries together (which is 0.219).
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In Column 57, we only relax the homogeneous long-run coe¢ cient restriction on human capital
investment. In this case the estimated common long-run coe¢ cient on the property tax share again
becomes positive and signicant.
In Column 58, interactions between the country group dummies and the property tax variable
are included in the long-run part of the PMG estimation. In this case, we restrict the long-run
coe¢ cient on property taxes to be the same across countries within a certain group, but allow this
long-run coe¢ cient to di¤er across groups. The results suggest that for countries in Group 1 and
Group 2, a higher share of property taxes in total tax revenue is associated with a higher level of
output per capita in the long run, but this association is not found for countries in Group 3.
Moreover, the Wald test rejects the null hypothesis that the estimated long-run coe¢ cients on
property taxes for all three groups of countries are equal at the 1 per cent level, but it does not reject
the null hypothesis that the long-run coe¢ cients on property taxes are equal for Group 1 and Group
2 countries.51 Therefore, it seems reasonable to impose the homogeneity restriction on the long-run
coe¢ cient on property taxes among the countries in both Group 1 and Group 2. This restriction
is imposed in Column 59. In this specication we continue to estimate a positive and signicant
long-run coe¢ cient on the share of property taxes for Group 1 and Group 2 countries, while the
long-run coe¢ cient for Group 3 countries remains negative and insignicant.
7 Conclusions
Recently, there has been considerable interest in the idea of reforming a countrys tax structure to be
"growth-promoting" by shifting tax revenue away from taxes on income and to taxes on consumption
and property. Although recent empirical studies, notably Arnold et al. (2011), suggest a ranking of
di¤erent types of taxes in terms of their e¤ects on the level of per capita income in the long run, the
ndings presented in this Chapter cast doubt on the robustness of this empirical result.
In this study, we analyse data for a panel of 17 OECD countries over the period 1970-2004.
Our benchmark Pooled Mean Group estimation results principally suggest that shifts in total tax
revenue towards property taxes may be associated with a higher steady-state level of income per
capita. This result remains robust when we use di¤erent samples, di¤erent regressors and di¤erent
specications of the time e¤ects. Relative to property taxes, raising more tax revenue from personal
income taxes, corporate income taxes or consumption taxes are all found to be associated with a
lower level of income per capita in the long run. However, we nd no strong evidence for favouring
personal income taxes over corporate income taxes, or for favouring consumption taxes over income
taxes, as previous studies have suggested.
Furthermore, when we allow the long-run coe¢ cients in our dynamic growth model to take
di¤erent values for each country, using a Mean Group estimator, we no longer nd a signicant
51The p-value for the Wald test of this restriction is 0.882.
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positive association between the share of tax revenue from property taxes and the long-run level
of income per capita. This motivates us to test the validity of restricting the long-run coe¢ cients
in the growth equation to be common across countries. Using a Wald test of these restrictions,
which appears to have more power that a Hausman test in this context, we nd that it is invalid
to impose the homogeneous long-run coe¢ cients restriction on all the explanatory variables in the
growth equation. Further investigations, imposing parameter restriction which are not rejected by
the Wald test, suggest that there may be a signicant positive association between the property tax
share and the long-run level of income per capita, but only for a sub-group of the countries in our
sample.
Our analysis suggests that it may be premature to draw concrete conclusions about the superiority
of taxes on consumption over taxes on income, or about the superiority of taxes on personal income
over taxes on corporate income, in terms of their e¤ects on long-run income levels. Therefore, caution
is advisable when making policy recommendations concerning "growth-promoting" revenue-neutral
tax structure reforms, especially for individual countries.
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Table 7.1: PMG estimation results from Arnold et al. (2011)
Variables (1) (2) (3) (4) (5) (6)
LR coe¢ cients
Physical capital 0.204*** 0.190*** 0.171*** 0.168*** 0.111*** 0.195***
(0.04) (0.05) (0.05) (0.05) (0.45) (0.05)
Human capital 0.99*** 1.30*** 1.18*** 1.40*** 1.57*** 1.52***
(0.11) (0.12) (0.13) (0.11) (0.11) (0.12)
Population growth -0.05*** -0.08*** -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.07*** -0.08***
(0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01) (0.01)
Tax revenue/GDP -0.24*** -0.26*** -0.22** -0.14*** -0.25**
(0.05) (0.05) (0.04) (0.04) (0.04)
Personal income taxes -1.13*** -1.35***
(0.19) (0.34)
Corporate income taxes -2.01*** -2.40***
(0.32) (0.43)
Consumption&Property taxes 0.93***
(0.20)
Consumption taxes 0.74*** 0.72*** 0.21
(0.18) (0.19) (0.34)
Property taxes 1.45***
(0.43)
Immovable property taxes 2.47***
(0.84)
Other property taxes -0.34
(0.51)
Mean convergence rate -0.30*** n.a.1 n.a. n.a. n.a. n.a.
(0.04)
Five-year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 699 675 696 696 678 675
1No estimate is reported in Arnold et al. (2011).
2Robust standard errors in parentheses.
3*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 7.2: Benchmark PMG estimations (17 OECD countries)
Variables (7) (8) (9) (10) (11) (12)
LR coe¢ cients
Physical capital 0.204*** 0.190*** 0.171*** 0.168*** 0.111*** 0.195***
(0.038) (0.039) (0.038) (0.039) (0.041) (0.037)
Human capital 2.157*** 2.441*** 2.453*** 2.442*** 2.624*** 2.438***
(0.152) (0.121) (0.136) (0.131) (0.126) (0.120)
Population growth -0.023** -0.038*** -0.036*** -0.036*** -0.050*** -0.029***
(0.010) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011) (0.011)
Tax revenue/GDP -0.062 -0.208*** -0.112 -0.180*** -0.032
(0.067) (0.077) (0.075) (0.068) (0.069)
Personal income taxes -1.047*** -2.654***
(0.184) (0.478)
Corporate income taxes -1.250*** -2.946***
(0.262)) (0.494)
Consumption&Property taxes 0.786***
(0.192)
Consumption taxes 0.828*** 0.570*** -1.575***
(0.211) (0.214) (0.455)
Property taxes 2.324***
(0.492)
Immovable property taxes 1.274**
(0.598)
Other property taxes 4.975***
(0.663)
Mean convergence rate -0.295*** -0.231*** -0.253*** -0.237*** -0.223*** -0.216***
(0.040) (0.047) (0.040) (0.041) (0.040) (0.045)
Five-year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 575 575 575 575 575 575
1Long-run coe¢ cients are obtained by imposing homogeneity across countries. The mean convergence
rate is the unweighted average of country-specic estimates.
2In this table and the subsequent tables, short-run dynamics are included, as in Equation (1.15).
3Robust standard errors in parentheses.
4*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 7.3: PMG estimation (21 OECD countries)
Variables (13) (14) (15) (16)
LR coe¢ cients
Physical capital 0.261*** 0.163*** 0.137*** 0.098*
(0.031) (0.039) (0.045) (0.056)
Human capital 1.522*** 2.289*** 2.029*** 1.938***
(0.091) (0.135) (0.102) (0.108)
Population growth -0.023*** -0.049*** -0.048*** -0.047***
(0.006) (0.012) (0.011) (0.011)
Tax revenue/GDP -0.159** -0.112 -0.019
(0.091) (0.084) (0.093)
Corporate income taxes 0.163
(0.255)
Consumption&Property taxes 0.964***
(0.204)
Consumption taxes 1.000*** 1.553***
(0.242) (0.300)
Property taxes 3.423*** 4.519***
(0.599) (0.763)
Mean convergence rate -0.276*** -0.219*** -0.206*** -0.165***
(0.051) (0.033) (0.038) (0.033)
Five-year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 679 679 679 679
1Robust standard errors in parentheses.
2***p<0.01, **p<0.05, *p<0.1.
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Table 7.4: PMG estimation with an alternative proxy for physical investment (17 OECD countries)
Variables (17) (18) (19) (20) (21) (22)
LR coe¢ cients
Physical capital 0.082 0.225*** 0.089*** 0.130*** 0.000 0.221***
(0.053) (0.038) (0.042) (0.041) (0.046) (0.039)
Human capital 2.434*** 2.633** 2.625*** 2.592*** 2.782*** 2.607***
(0.215) (0.118) (0.155) (0.142) (0.147) (0.123)
Population growth -0.022* -0.029*** -0.044*** -0.041*** -0.050*** -0.024**
(0.013) (0.010) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012) (0.010)
Tax revenue/GDP 0.023 -0.108 -0.041 -0.126* 0.039
(0.066) (0.081) (0.078) (0.075) (0.072)
PIT -1.227*** -2.542***
(0.188) (0.483)
CIT -1.774*** -3.061***
(0.275) (0.501)
Consumption&Property taxes 1.103***
(0.226)
Consumption taxes 1.035*** 0.773*** -1.275***
(0.234) (0.253) (0.461)
Property taxes 2.883***
(0.539)
Immovable property taxes 1.639**
(0.703)
Other property taxes 5.810***
(0.789)
Convergence rate -0.257*** -0.250*** -0.267*** -0.250*** -0.227*** -0.230***
(0.027) (0.053) (0.040) (0.041) (0.036) (0.050)
Five-year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 533 533 533 533 533 533
1Robust standard errors in parentheses.
2*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 7.5: PMG estimation with alternative ve-year period dummies (17 OECD countries)
Variables (23) (24) (25) (26) (27) (28)
LR coe¢ cients
Physical capital 0.225*** 0.160*** 0.212*** 0.197*** 0.159*** 0.168***
(0.027) (0.040) (0.032) (0.033) (0.031) (0.040)
Human capital 2.616*** 2.611*** 2.660*** 2.562*** 2.693*** 2.560***
(0.125) (0.161) (0.138) (0.134) (0.110) (0.147)
Population growth -0.039*** -0.059*** -0.054*** -0.052*** -0.055*** -0.057***
(0.008) (0.011) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010) (0.010)
Tax revenue/GDP -0.129* -0.116* -0.177*** -0.262*** -0.174***
(0.071) (0.060) (0.053) (0.044) (0.060)
Personal income taxes -0.084 -1.056***
(0.196) (0.327)
Corporate income taxes 0.337 -0.883***
(0.245) (0.323)
Consumption&Property taxes 0.039
(0.184)
Consumption taxes -0.311* 0.087 -1.354***
(0.177) (0.169) (0.328)
Property taxes 0.847***
(0.301)
Immovable property taxes -0.136
(0.327)
Other property taxes 3.596***
(0.612)
Mean convergence rate -0.337*** -0.258*** -0.282*** -0.278*** -0.255*** -0.265***
(0.047) (0.041) (0.042) (0.045) (0.051) (0.044)
Alternative ve-year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 575 575 575 575 575 575
1Robust standard errors in parentheses.
2*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 7.6: PMG estimation with alternative ve-year period dummies and an alternative proxy for
physical investment (17 OECD countries)
Variables (29) (30) (31) (32) (33) (34)
LR coe¢ cients
Physical capital 0.170*** 0.227*** -0.031 0.173*** 0.113*** 0.186***
(0.035) (0.041) (0.056) (0.034) (0.032) (0.041)
Human capital 2.925*** 2.929*** 3.247*** 2.935*** 2.750*** 2.899***
(0.169) (0.165) (0.272) (0.151) (0.119) (0.154)
Population growth -0.041*** -0.062*** -0.120*** -0.051*** -0.045*** -0.051***
(0.010) (0.013) (0.024) (0.012) (0.011) (0.012)
Tax revenue/GDP 0.052 0.292** -0.148** -0.249*** -0.121*
(0.077) (0.118) (0.061) (0.050) (0.065)
Personal income taxes -0.680*** -1.621***
(0.231) (0.394)
Corporate income taxes -0.927*** -1.716***
(0.319) (0.401)
Consumption&Property taxes 1.080***
(0.311)
Consumption taxes 0.084 0.392** -1.470***
(0.213) (0.187) (0.372)
Property taxes 1.477***
(0.385)
Immovable property taxes 0.171
(0.373)
Other property taxes 5.210***
(0.722)
Mean convergence rate -0.295*** -0.237*** -0.175*** -0.253*** -0.256*** -0.247***
(0.045) (0.047) (0.036) (0.043) (0.049) (0.049)
Alternative ve-year dummies Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 533 533 533 533 533 533
1Robust standard errors in parentheses
2*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 7.7: PMG estimation with linear trends (17 OECD countries)
Variables (35) (36) (37) (38) (39) (40)
LR coe¢ cients
Physical capital 0.243*** 0.242*** 0.245*** 0.274*** 0.202*** 0.273***
(0.032) (0.030) (0.031) (0.022) (0.020) (0.022)
Human capital -0.194 0.677** 0.863*** 0.873*** 0.955*** 1.079***
(0.291) (0.307) (0.300) (0.249) (0.177) (0.268)
Population growth -0.043*** -0.065*** -0.057*** -0.042*** -0.039*** -0.041***
(0.012) (0.014) (0.013) (0.008) (0.008) (0.008)
Tax revenue/GDP -0.271*** -0.274*** -0.336*** -0.348*** -0.363***
(0.071) (0.067) (0.054) (0.024) (0.051)
Personal income taxes -0.804*** -1.571***
(0.196) (0.200)
Corporate income taxes -0.365* -1.714***
(0.199) (0.261)
Consumption&Property taxes 0.502***
(0.186)
Consumption taxes 0.121 -0.525*** -1.439***
(0.147) (0.079) (0.225)
Property taxes 1.676***
(0.220)
Immovable property taxes -0.123
(0.201)
Other property taxes 3.308***
(0.218)
Mean convergence rate -0.217*** -0.196*** -0.203*** -0.241*** -0.257*** -0.237***
(0.024) (0.027) (0.031) (0.037) (0.054) (0.040)
Linear trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 575 575 575 575 575 575
1Robust standard errors in parentheses
2*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 7.8: PMG estimation allowing for cross-section dependence (17 OECD countries)
Variables (41) (42) (43) (44)
LR coe¢ cients
Physical capital 0.176*** 0.225*** 0.231*** 0.188***
(0.025) (0.009) (0.015) (0.015)
Human capital -0.044 -0.360*** -0.394*** -0.278**
(0.202) (0.096) (0.134) (0.119)
Population growth -0.035** -0.013*** -0.022** -0.029***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009)
Tax revenue/GDP -0.241*** -0.246*** -0.327***
(0.020) (0.027) (0.028)
Personal income taxes 0.095*
(0.051)
Corporate income taxes -0.214***
(0.091)
Consumption & Property taxes 0.125
(0.083)
Consumption taxes -0.366***
(0.097)
Property taxes 0.887***
(0.195)
Mean convergence rate -0.344*** -0.593*** -0.485*** -0.478***
(0.054) (0.107) (0.081) (0.077)
Observations 575 575 575 575
1Robust standard errors in parentheses.
2*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 7.9: Property taxes and growth in di¤erent PMG estimations
Variables (45) (46) (47) (48) (49)
LR coe¢ cients
Physical capital 0.259*** 0.225*** 0.180*** 0.266*** 0.178***
(0.035) (0.041) (0.039) (0.024) (0.017)
Human capital 2.341*** 2.005*** 2.449*** 0.800*** 0.238
(0.137) (0.123) (0.154) (0.255) (0.162)
Population growth -0.017** -0.033*** -0.022** -0.043*** -0.020***
(0.008) (0.009) (0.009) (0.009) (0.005)
Tax revenue/GDP -0.369*** -0.370*** -0.325*** -0.387*** -0.232***
(0.075) (0.083) (0.075) (0.050) (0.028)
Property taxes 1.032*** 1.391*** 1.675*** 1.606*** 0.841***
(0.354) (0.394) (0.436) (0.222) (0.194)
Convergence rate -0.268*** -0.228*** -0.282*** -0.238*** -0.431***
(0.044) (0.037) (0.046) (0.032) (0.054)
Five-year dummies Yes Yes Yes
Linear trends Yes
Cross-section dependence Yes
Observations 575 679 533 575 575
1The original sample of 17 countries is used in Columns 45, 47, 48 and 49. A sample of 21 countries
is used in Column 46. We use thethe alternative specication of ve-year period dummies in Column
46, and the alternative measure for physical investment share in Column 47.
2Robust standard errors in parentheses.
3*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Table 7.10: Property taxes and growth: PMG, MG, pooled OLS and FE estimations (17 OECD
countries)
Variables (50) (51) (52) (53) (54)
PMG Unweighted MG Weighted MG OLS FE
LR coe¢ cients
Physical capital 0.266*** 0.428*** 0.356*** 0.223 0.019
(0.024) (0.088) (0.058) (0.426) (0.392)
Human capital 0.800*** 1.826 0.800 -0.234 0.527
(0.255) (1.164) (0.862) (1.001 (0.682)
Population growth -0.043*** -0.070** -0.037 -0.324* -0.298**
(0.009) (0.031) (0.023) (0.168) (0.168)
Tax revenue/GDP -0.387*** -0.228 -0.181 -0.440 -0.962
(0.050) (0.191) (0.179) (0.495) (0.708)
Property taxes 1.606*** 1.526 0.852 -2.839 -2.673
(0.222) (2.576) (0.868) (2.568) (3.731)
Convergence rate -0.238*** -0.322*** -0.299*** -0.014 -0.024**
(0.032) (0.045) (0.043) (0.006) (0.010)
Linear trends Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 575 575 575 575 575
1Column 50 presents the common long-run coe¢ cients and the mean convergence rate obtained
by the PMG estimator; Columns 51 and 52 present the mean long-run coe¢ cients and the mean
convergence rate obtained by the unweighted and weighted MG estimators; Columns 53 and 54
present the common long-run coe¢ cients and the common convergence rate obtained by the OLS
and the xed-e¤ects within-groups regressions.
2Robust standard errors in parentheses.
3*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 7.11: Hausman tests of the homogeneous long-run coe¢ cients restriction
LR coe¢ cients MG PMG Di¤erence S.E1
a. Unweighted MG and PMG
Physical capital 0.428 0.266 0.162 0.085
(0.088) (0.024)
Human capital 1.826 0.800 1.026 1.136
(1.164) (0.255)
Population growth -0.070 -0.043 -0.027 0.030
(0.031) (0.009)
Tax revenue/ GDP -0.228 -0.387 0.158 0.184
(0.191) (0.050)
Property taxes 1.526 1.606 -0.080 2.567
(2.576) (0.222)
Hausman test 2(5) = 5:1 Prob > 2 = 0:404
b. Weighted MG and PMG
Physical capital 0.356 0.266 0.090 0.052
(0.058) (0.024)
Human capital 0.800 0.800 0.000 0.824
(0.862) (0.255)
Population growth -0.037 -0.043 0.007 0.021
(0.023) (0.009)
Tax revenue/ GDP -0.181 -0.387 0.206 0.172
(0.179) (0.050)
Property taxes 0.852 1.606 -0.754 0.839
(0.868) (0.222)
1S.E=
p
V ar(MG)  V ar(PMG)
2Robust standard errors for the MG and PMG estimates in parentheses
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Table 7.12: Long-run coe¢ cients and speed of convergence for individual countries
Variables Australia Austria Belgium Canada Denmark Finland France Greece Ireland
Convergence rate -0.358*** -0.152 -0.399 -0.419** -0.442* -0.333** -0.094 -0.212 -0.696***
(0.107) (0.116) (0.262) (0.197) (0.233) (0.166) (0.221) (0.178) (0.115)
Physical Capital 0.187 0.785 0.195 0.428** 0.204** 0.028 0.611 0.528*** 0.286***
(0.172) (0.560) (0.179) (0.221) (0.109) (0.192) (0.449) (0.132) (0.059)
Human Capital -4.124*** 1.867 0.376 -1.785 0.439 2.873 7.508 0.329 2.455*
(0.951) (4.136) (0.666) (2.183) (1.513) (1.751) (14.639) (2.550) (1.290)
Population Growth -0.011 -0.097 -0.001 -0.033 0.033 0.047 0.065 -0.037 -0.022*
(0.023) (0.094) (0.040) (0.040) (0.041) (0.075) (0.215) (0.082) (0.012)
Tax Revenue/ GDP 0.196 -0.166 -0.106 -0.221 -0.059 -0.321 -0.472 -0.186 -0.065
(0.285) (1.112) (0.246) (0.302) (0.169) (0.231) (2.115) (0.651) (0.142)
Property Taxes 0.836 6.012 1.435 -0.294 0.262 13.495* 20.932 0.970 1.559***
(1.477) (7.124) (5.740) (2.201) (2.551) (7.462) (57.136) (1.155) (0.567)
Japan Netherlands New Norway Sweden Switzerland UK US Wald test
Zealand (p-value)
Convergence rate -0.328 -0.201*** -0.301** -0.167 -0.309 -0.756** -0.229** -0.086
(0.208) (0.074) (0.126) (0.143) (0.190) (0.306) (0.104) (0.184)
Physical Capital 0.462*** 0.609** 0.303** 0.369 0.273** 0.479*** -0.044 1.572 0.603
(0.134) (0.269) (0.146) (0.260) (0.109) (0.159) (0.280) (2.912)
Human Capital 3.812** -2.363 -1.015 2.593 -1.17 -1.673*** 4.151* 16.77 0.000
(1.661) (2.563) (4.379) (3.130) (1.538) (0.646) (2.362) (38.034)
Population Growth 0.039 -0.136 -0.014 -0.37 -0.113 -0.021 -0.166** -0.357 0.803
(0.110) (0.121) (0.020) (0.342) (0.073) (0.018) (0.084) (0.693)
Tax Revenue/ GDP -0.383 -0.024 -0.869* -2.509 -0.131 0.155 -0.424** 1.704 0.676
(0.463) (0.554) (0.453) (2.846) (0.217) (0.151) (0.176) (2.853)
Property Taxes -0.219 1.095 -8.795 -28.865 -0.758 -1.29 3.581*** 15.982  0.231
(1.140) (4.997) (6.270) (24.312) (0.979) (1.259) (1.373) (31.015)
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 7.13: Relaxing the homogeneity restriction on some long-run coe¢ cients
Country-specific coefficients
Variables Australia Austria Belgium Canada Denmark Finland France Greece Ireland
Human capital -4.217*** -0.639 0.728 -1.261 0.713 1.244*** 3.496* 2.391 2.574***
(0.877) (2.525) (0.505) (1.838) (1.382) (0.467) (2.070) (5.408) (0.526)
Property tax -0.208 1.556 0.678 -0.907 -1.79 3.124** 8.554 1.287 1.352***
(0.914) (3.488) (1.992) (1.312) (2.597) (1.390) (9.951) (1.336) (0.294)
Convergence rate -0.324*** -0.251*** -0.331*** -0.375*** -0.264** -0.586*** -0.138** -0.140 -0.713***
(0.066) (0.067) (0.095) (0.093) (0.114) (0.133) (0.064) (0.096) (0.105)
Japan Netherlands New Norway Sweden Switzerland UK US Wald test
Zealand (p-value)
Human capital 3.155*** -1.790*** -7.663** 1.081 -1.118 -0.546 2.616* 52.158 0.000
(0.751) (0.577) (3.487) (1.294) (1.026) (0.359) (1.502) (226.336)
Property tax 0.915 0.404 -1.792 -4.873 -0.439 -0.395 1.533** 18.083 0.219
(0.954) (2.157) (4.886) (3.763) (0.703) (0.796) (0.620) (77.363)
Convergence rate -0.298*** -0.344*** -0.236*** -0.247** -0.377*** -0.619*** -0.250*** -0.026
(0.093) (0.053) (0.078) (0.118) (0.116) (0.148) (0.080) (0.081)
Common coefficients
Physical capital 0.265***
(0.021)
Population growth -0.026***
(0.006)
Tax revenue/GDP -0.168***
(0.046)
Robust standard errors in parentheses, *** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1
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Table 7.14: Imposing data-consistent restrictions on long-run coe¢ cients
Variables (55) (56) (57) (58) (59)
LR coe¢ cients
Physical capital 0.266*** 0.265*** 0.260*** 0.277*** 0.277***
(0.024) (0.021) (0.020) (0.018) (0.018)
Human capital 0.800***
(0.255)
Population growth -0.043*** -0.026*** -0.033*** -0.028*** -0.028***
(0.009) (0.006) (0.006) (0.005) (0.005)
Tax revenue/GDP -0.387*** -0.168*** -0.159*** -0.144*** -0.145***
(0.050) (0.046) (0.050) (0.042) (0.042)
Property taxes 1.606*** 1.127***
(0.222) (0.214)
Property Taxes*Group 1 1.466***
(0.220)
Property Taxes*Group 2 1.361**
(0.667)
Property Taxes*Group 3 -0.472 -0.471
(0.374) (0.374)
Property Taxes*Group 1&2 1.457***
(0.208)
Average country-specic coe¢ cients
Human capital 0.110 0.135 0.056 0.056
(0.223) (0.207) (0.210) (0.210)
Property taxes 0.184
(0.170)
Convergence rate -0.238*** -0.325*** -0.284*** -0.322*** -0.321***
(0.032) (0.043) (0.036) (0.043) (0.043)
Linear trend Yes Yes Yes Yes Yes
Observations 575 575 575 575 575
1Standard errors in parentheses.
2*** p<0.01, ** p<0.05, * p<0.1.
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Appendix A: Denition and sources of variables
The variables used in the regressions are dened as follows:
 Real GDP per capita (y): GDP at constant prices and constant PPPs (in millions US dollars)
divided by the level of population aged 15-64 (in thousands). (Real GDP is provided by OECD
National Accounts and the level of population aged 15-64 is provided by OECD Labour Force
Statistics).
 Physical capital investment  sk: total gross xed capital formation as a share of GDP (OECD
National Account).
 Human capita investment (h): proxied by the average number of years of schooling of the
population aged 25 to 64, taken from Arnold et al. (2007).
 Population growth (n): the annual growth rate of population aged 15-64 in percent (OECD
Labour Force Statistics).
 Five-year period dummies: in the benchmark estimations, the period of 1970-2004 is split into
7 groups (1970-1975, 1976-1980, 1981-1985, 1986-1990, 1991-1995, 1996-2000, 2001-2004). In
Section 5.2.1, the period of 1970-2004 is split into 7 groups in an alternative way (1970-1974,
1975-1979, 1980-1984, 1985-1989, 1990-1994, 1995-1999, 2000-2004).
The following variables are taken from OECD Tax Revenue Statistics.
 Total tax revenue/GDP: this is the total tax revenue as a percentage of GDP.
 Income taxes: this includes taxes on income, prots and capital gains (categories 1000), social
security contributions (category 2000) and taxes on payroll and workforce (category 3000).
 Personal income taxes: this includes taxes on individual income, prots and capital gains (cat-
egory 1100), social security contributions (category 2000) and taxes on payroll and workforce
(category 3000).
 Corporate income taxes: this includes taxes on corporate income, prots and capital gains
(category 1200).
 Consumption and property taxes: this is the total of consumption taxes (category 5000, 6000)
and property taxes (category 4000).
 Consumption taxes: this includes taxes on goods and services (category 5000) and other
consumption taxes (category 6000). Taxes on goods and services include taxes on production,
sales, transfer, etc (category 5100), taxes on the permission to use goods or to perform activities
(category 5200), and unallocable between category 5100 and 5200.
 Property taxes: this includes recurrent taxes on immovable property (category 4100), recurrent
taxes on net wealth (category 4200), taxes on estates, inheritances and gifts (category 4300),
taxes on nancial and capital transactions (category 4400), non-recurrent taxes (category 4500)
and other recurrent taxes on property (category 4600).
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Descriptive statistics of key variables
Variables Mean S.D Min Max
ln y 10.358 0.249 9.563 10.978
ln sk 3.089 0.174 2.714 3.591
lnh 2.374 0.123 2.001 2.595
n 0.811 0.648 -0.888 4.729
Tax revenue/GDP 0.355 0.078 0.181 0.522
Personal income taxes/Tax revenue 0.548 0.078 0.265 0.726
Corporate income taxes/Tax revenue 0.081 0.046 0.006 0.281
Consumption taxes/Tax revenue 0.303 0.076 0.128 0.524
Property taxes /Tax revenue 0.064 0.036 0.008 0.214
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Appendix B: Proportions of major tax revenues in total tax mix
Australia Austria
Belgium Canada
Denmark Finland
43
France Greece
Ireland Japan
Netherlands New Zealand
44
Norway Sweden
Switzerland United Kingdom
United States
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Appendix C: Calculation of Equation (1.10) and Equation (1.14)
1. This shows how we obtain Equation (4.6).
From Equation (4.5), we have:
y = (k)(h) =
 
s1 k s

h
n+ g + d
! 
1  
(h)
Taking logarithms, we obtain the following:
ln y =  ln k + 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=
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where the fourth line follows from the fact that in the steady state, according to Equation (4.3),
sh =
(n+g+d)h
y . Rearranging the above equation, we obtain that:
ln y =

1   ln sk +

1   lnh
   
1   ln(n+ g + d)
2. This shows how we obtain Equation (1.14).
From Equation (4.9), we have the following expression:
ln yt   ln yt s =  ' ()

ln yt s   
1   ln sk  

1   lnh
 +

1   ln(n+ g + d)

where y = YAL . Taking s = 1, then it is equivalent to express Equation (4.9) in the following way:
ln
Yt
AtLt
  ln Yt 1
At 1Lt 1
=  ' ()
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! ln eyt ln eyt 1 =  ' () [ln eyt 1   F ]+' () lnA0+g [' () t  ' () + 1]
3. We follow Arnold et al. (2007) to approximate ln sk using ln sk;t +   ln sk;t; as the share
of human capital investment in GDP in the steady state (sk) is not observable.   is a function of
parameters of the model that need not be specied and the term   ln sk;t is included in the short-
run dynamics in Equation 1.15. Similarly, we approximate lnh using lnht + 	 lnht; where 	 is
a function of parameters and the term 	 lnht is included in the short-run dynamics in Equation
1.15. Following Arnold et al. (2007), we approximate ln(n + g + d) using nt; as both g and d are
not directly observable.
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